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IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?
THE TROUBLED MARRIAGE OF
SCIENCE AND LAW*
SUSAN HAACK**
In many respects [the scientific expert] seems to be a positive annoyance to lawyers,
and even to judges at times, a sort of intractable, incompatible, inharmonious factor,
disturbing the otherwise smooth current of legal procedure; too important or
necessary to be ruled out, too intelligent and disciplined mentally to yield without
reason to ordinary rules and regulations of the court,.., and, at the same time[,]
possessing an undoubted influence with the jury, that it is difficult to restrict by the
established rules and maxims of legal procedure.
It is often said, with good cause, that... the goal of a trial and the goal of science
are.., at odds.... [A]s a general rule,... courts don't do science very well.

I
GETTING STARTED

There was not a lot to be said for the miserable weeks after Hurricanes
Katrina and Wilma-except, in retrospect, that all those hours spent sweating in
the dark prompted some vivid thoughts about what life must have been like
before electric light and power were available at the flick of a switch, and
renewed my appreciation of the countless ways in which science now permeates
just about every aspect of modern life.
"Every aspect of modern life" including, of course, the legal system. Legal
proceedings now often rely significantly on scientific testimony, and scientific
advisors contribute significantly to regulatory decisionmaking. Moreover, the
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1. Charles F. Himes, The Scientific Expert in ForensicProcedure,135 J. FRANKLIN INST. 407, 41112 (1893).
2. EDWARD HUMES, MONKEY GIRL: EVOLUTION, EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND THE BATTLE
FOR AMERICA'S SOUL 257 (2007).
3. See generally Symposium, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(Autumn 2003) (issue devoted to regulatory science).
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law regulates potentially hazardous scientific research;' it may get involved
when fraud is alleged in scientific work funded by government grants; and it
may be called on to resolve disputes between scientific interests and interests of
other kinds, for example, in "cultural heritage" cases such as the tussle over the
fate of the 9,000-year-old skeleton of Kennewick Man,' or in constitutional
cases over high-school biology teaching.'
I shall confine myself here largely to scientific testimony in litigation; which,
from the beginning, has prompted complaints both about the venality and
dishonesty of scientific witnesses and about the scientific ignorance and
credulity of jurors, attorneys, and judges. But some of what I have to say will
also be relevant to the other contexts in which science interacts with the law; for
the core of my argument will be that there are deep tensions between the goals
and values of the scientific enterprise and the culture of the law, especially the
culture of the U.S. legal system:8 between the investigative character of science
and the adversarial culture of our legal system; between the scientific search for
general principles and the legal focus on particular cases; between the pervasive
fallibilism of the sciences-its openness to revision in the light of new
evidence-and the concern of the law for prompt and final resolutions; between
the scientific push for innovation and the legal system's concern for precedent;
between the informal, problem-oriented pragmatism of scientific investigation
and the reliance of the legal system on formal rules and procedures; and
between the essentially theoretical aspirations of science and the legal system's
inevitable orientation to policy.
The first step will be to sketch how the legal system began to use scientific
experts, and how it has tried to accommodate their testimony to its own culture;
the next, to understand what it is about the nature of science and the culture of
law that makes the scientific expert, as Dr. Himes says, "a sort of intractable,
incompatible, inharmonious factor, disturbing the smooth current of legal
procedure"; then to illustrate how the tensions between science and the law
reveal themselves in practice; and finally to comment, very briefly, on some
efforts to alleviate the tensions.
4. See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE-WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM
AND CYNICISM 322-24 (2003) (discussing National Institutes of Health (NIH) regulation of early
research on recombinant DNA).
5. For example, in the case of Dr. Eric Poehlman, who pled guilty to lying on a federal grant
application and to fabricating data, over more than a decade, on obesity, menopause, and aging, see
generally Jeneen Interlandi, An Unwelcome Discovery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at 98; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Poehlman, No. 2:05-CR-38-01 (D. Vt. Mar. 17, 2005); Sentencing
Judgment, United States v. Poehlman, No. 2:05-CR-38-01 (D. Vt. June 30, 2005).
6. Bonnischen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004); see also JEFF BENEDICT, No BONE
UNTURNED: THE ADVENTURES OF A TOP SMITHSONIAN FORENSIC SCIENTIST AND THE LEGAL
BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S OLDEST SKELETONS (2003).

7. See, most recently, Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005),
and Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). See generally HUMES,
supra note 2 (telling the background story of Kitzmiller, and summarizing the trial proceedings).
8. Unless otherwise indicated, in what follows the phrase "the culture of the law" will refer
specifically to the U.S. legal culture.
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THE SCIENTIFIC WITNESS

Of course, there haven't always been scientific witnesses; in fact, there
haven't always been witnesses. In early medieval times, courts relied on tests by
oath, ordeal, and sometimes (though in England, apparently, only rarely) by
combat.' A defendant in an action for debt, for example, might swear under
oath that he owed nothing, and bring in "oath-helpers" or "con-jurors" to swear
under oath that his statement under oath was not perjured." "[P]roof was not an
attempt to convince the judges," Frederic Maitland writes, but "an appeal to the
supernatural." 1' This system of in-court tests-"proof" in the old sense of the
word-rested on theologically based assumptions: that God would punish those
who swore falsely, would ensure that an innocent defendant obliged to plunge
his arm into boiling water was not scalded, and so on.
But by 1215, when the Fourth Lateran Council prohibited priests from
participating in such tests, courts were gradually adopting other ways to
proceed. On the Continent, the authorities turned to the Inquisition and to
canonical law; in England, they turned to juries. 3 The first jury trial was held in
Westminster in 1220, when five defendants who had been accused by a selfconfessed murderer in hopes of saving her own life agreed to submit to the
judgment of twelve of their property-owning neighbors;'4 and as the old system
of in-court tests gradually fell into disuse, the new system of trial by jury
gradually spread. However, in these early jury trials no witnesses were called;
instead, jurors might go around town investigating for themselves, or might be
specially chosen for their expertise-for example, a jury of vintners in a case in
which a defendant was accused of selling bad wine, or a jury of butchers when
the charge was selling putrid meat."
And even when witnesses first began to be called, the system was still preadversarial, with witnesses serving not a party to the case, but the court.'6
Gradually, however, the present adversarial practice developed, with witnesses
prepared and presented by one party and cross-examined by the other, and
formal rules restricting what evidence is admissible for the jury to hear. There

9. FREDERIC WILLIAMS MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 309 (1909).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See PAUL R. HYAMS, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 101 (1981) (arguing that
rejection of trial by ordeal "was at least a century and a half old in 1215 when the Fourth Lateran
Council proclaimed the church's official disapproval").
13. MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 311.
14. Four of the defendants were hanged; one was acquitted when the jurors swore he had not
broken the law. SADAKAT KADRI, THE TRIAL: A HISTORY, FROM SOCRATES TO O.J. SIMPSON 69-70

(2005).
15. Learned Hand, Historicaland PracticalConsiderationsRegarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 41 (1901).
16. Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen and Product Liability: An HistoricalSurvey of the
Use of Expert Testimony, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131,135-38 (1995).
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had long been expert witnesses: courts had called on Latin scholars, for
example, to help in construing unclear documents, and on physicians to give
their opinions on the medicinal value of wolf-flesh in healing wounds;'7 but now
experts, like other witnesses, served the parties.
Learned Hand takes the essential characteristic of an expert witness, in the
modern sense, to be that he is not bound by the "opinion rule," according to
which a witness's conclusions are inadmissible.'8 He dates the first appearance
of such witnesses to 1620, when in Alsop v. Bowtrell'9 physicians testified that it
was possible for a woman to bear a legitimate child "forty weeks and nine days"
after the death of her husband.'0 Stephan Landsman takes the more important
point to be that expert witnesses are called by the parties and subject to cross2
examination.2 He suggests a later date, 1782, when in Folkes v. Chadd
engineers appeared for each side in an action in which the plaintiff sought
damages because a harbor had silted up, allegedly as a result of the construction
of a bank to prevent flooding in a nearby meadow.' (Tal Golan argues,
however, that experts for the parties had been seen as early as 1678,4 and that
what was novel in Folkes v. Chadd was that the scientists involved relied on
general, hypothetical scientific principles.)25
As soon as the U.S. legal system came to rely significantly on scientific
experts, complaints arose from all sides: expert witnesses-physicians
especially-complained about the way they were treated under crossexamination; and both legal and scientific commentators expressed concern
about the rise of what they perceived as a new class of partisan and
untrustworthy professional experts. And as the use of scientific experts grew, so
did the complaints. As early as 1858, the Supreme Court was observing wryly
that "experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be
experts can be obtained in any amount" ;26 in 1874, John Ordronaux was
complaining in the Journal of Insanity that "[f]atal exhibitions of scientific
inaccuracy and self-contradiction.., can not but weaken public confidence in

17. Id. at 133.
18. Hand, supra note 15, at 45.
19. Alsop v. Bowtrell, Cro. Jac. 541, 541 (1620).
20. Hand, supra note 15, at 45 (noting that the expert witness, as an exception to the opinion rule,
is a kind of relic left over from the older system, before the opinion rule limited lay witnesses'
testimony).
21. Landsman, supra note 16, at 141.
22. Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 157-58 (1782); JAMES THAYER, SELECT CASES ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON LAW 666 (1892).
23. Landsman, supra note 16, at 141.
24. TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT

TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 41 (2004) (citing Rex v. Pembroke (1678) in 7 COBBETT'S
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 185-86 (Thomas

J.Howell ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1810)).
25. Golan, supra, note 24, at 43-44.
26. Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88,101 (1858).
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the value of all such evidence";27 in 1884, the court in Ferguson v. Hubbell8

advised that expert testimony "should not be much encouraged and should be
received only in cases of necessity," because their opinions "cannot fail
generally to be warped by a desire to promote the cause in which they are
enlisted";29 in 1893, Dr. Himes observed that scientific witnesses "are selected
on account of their ability to express a favorable opinion, which, there is great
reason to believe, in many instances [is] the result... of [their] employment [as
witnesses], and the bias growing out of it"; and in 1910, a contributor wrote in
the Yale Law Journal that "It]here is constant complaining1' and mistrust on the
part of the judges, juries and lawyers of the expert witness.'
In 1925, John Scopes was convicted of teaching evolution to a high-school
biology class, in contravention of Tennessee's Anti-Evolution Act.32 Clarence
Darrow had recruited a whole team of scientific experts to testify in Scopes's
defense, but the judge excluded all but one of them. At the time, "nationally
accepted court rules discouraged expert testimony."33 In fact, what is now seen
as a key move to domesticate scientific testimony in the legal context had been
made a couple of years before, when in Frye v. United States the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia gave a test to determine, not just whether
a scientific witness was qualified to testify, but whether novel scientific
testimony was good enough for the jury to hear: the "scientific principle or
discovery" on which that testimony was based must be "sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the field to which it belongs."35 It was
decades before the "Frye Rule" began to spread, but by the early 1980s it had
become the accepted standard in many states; and it remains so to this day in
the District of Columbia and in a number of states, including California, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Florida. 6

27. John Ordronaux, On Expert Testimony in Judicial Proceedings,317 J. INSANITY 317 (1874). At
the time, Ordronaux was a member of the State Commission in Lunacy. Obituary, Dr. John
Ordronaux,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1908.
28. Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (N.Y. 1884).
29. Id.
30. Himes, supra note 1, at 409; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
31. Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J. 247,247 (1910).
32. Scopes v. State, 278 S.W. 57, 57 (Tenn. 1925).
33.

EDWARD J. LARSON, TRIAL AND ERROR: THE AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER CREATION

AND EVOLUTION 68 (3d ed. 2003) (citing THOMAS STEWART & ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYES, THE

137, 150-53
(Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1971) (1925); 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 629-30, 633, 649-56, 687-88 (1979); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702-03 (1982)). In Kitzmiller, a whole parade of expert
witnesses, on both sides, dominated the proceedings. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp.
2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
34. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
35. Id. at 1014.
36. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other
Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001). Michigan stuck with Frye until 2004, when it
shifted to Daubert. MICH. R. EvID. 702 (2003); People v. Wright, No. 261380, 2006 WL 2271264 at *5
WORLD'S MOST FAMOUS COURT TRIAL: STATE OF TENNESSEE V. JOHN THOMAS SCOPES

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 72:1

In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted. Rule 702, on expert
testimony, said nothing explicit about "general acceptance," only that a
qualified expert may testify provided that his or her evidence is relevant to facts

at issue, and not otherwise legally excluded. 7 In 1993, the Supreme Court's
ruling in Dauberd' established that in federal jurisdictions the new Rule 702 had
superseded Frye, but also that federal courts' "gatekeeping" role nevertheless
requires them to screen proffered expert testimony for reliability as well as for
relevance." In 1997, the Court confirmed in Joinerthat the standard of review
for such evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion; and in 1999, the Court
confirmed in Kumho that Daubert covers all expert testimony, not only the
scientific. In 2001, Rule 702 was revised to require that expert testimony be
based on "sufficient facts or data," arrived at by "reliable principles and
methods" "reliably" applied to the facts of the case. 2
Still, despite all these efforts, I don't suppose anyone for a moment imagines
that all the problems are now fully resolved. The Daubert ruling is far from
unambiguous; its philosophical underpinnings are far from sound;4" and its
articulation of the idea of evidentiary reliability is far from transparent.'
Moreover, though Justice Blackmun's rhetoric suggested that the intent was to
relax the standards of admissibility,45 in civil cases the upshot seems to have
been to restrict them. 6 The Joiner ruling distances itself somewhat from

(Mich. App. Aug. 8, 2006), ("MRE 702 was specifically amended, effective January 1, 2004, to
incorporate the Daubertstandards.").
37. FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.").
38. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
39. Id. at 589 ("[The Frye Rule is an] austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, [and] should not be applied in federal trials.").
40. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997) ("We hold that abuse of discretion is the
appropriate standard.").
41. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("We conclude that Daubert'sgeneral
holding-setting forth the trial judge's 'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to testimony based
on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized'
knowledge.").
42. FED. R. EvID. 702 (2001) ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.").
43. See generally Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 95
AM. J. PUB.HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S66 (2005).
44. See generally Susan Haack, Peer Review and Publication:Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETSON L.
REV. 789, 811 (2007).
45. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
46. See Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 65, 68 (2006) ("[T]he [Daubert]
Court's casually offered guidelines on admitting expert scientific evidence have served as the vehicle
for transforming Daubert from an evidence-liberalizing decision into an evidence-narrowing one.");
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Daubert's muddled philosophy of science-but creates further concerns about
the blurring of questions of admissibility with questions of the weight or the
sufficiency of evidence; the Kumho Tire ruling finally acknowledges that what
really matters is not whether expert testimony is science, but whether it is
reliable-yet it seems to leave all the tricky stuff to courts' discretion. And the
revised Rule
702, with its emphatic repetition of "reliable," "reliably," and
"sufficient," '7 is apt to leave one doubtful whether any verbal formula, by itself,
could make it possible to determine whether the data on which a scientific
witness bases his opinion are sufficient, or whether his methods are reliable.
So it comes as no surprise that the old complaints about tainted, partial
experts and ignorant, credulous attorneys, jurors, and judges are still heardand now, also, a new complaint, as would-be scientific witnesses whose
testimony has been ruled inadmissible by a court protest the professional insult
of being "dauberted out" when a judge deems their proffered testimony
unreliable, even "unscientific."' No doubt there are biased and incompetent
experts, attorneys who encourage such experts into the legal system, gullible
jurors overimpressed by the supposed authority of a witness merely on account
of his scientific credentials, and scientifically illiterate judges too ready to
dismiss an expert witness's unwelcome proffered testimony as not really science
at all. But underlying these familiar complaints are the "irreconcilable
differences" to which my title alludes: deep tensions between the goals, the
processes, the values, and the timetable of scientific inquiry, and legal goals,
processes, values, and schedules.
III
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE AND THE CULTURE OF LAW

It is sometimes said that science is a search for truth; and this is right, if
rightly understood. The core business of the sciences is inquiry; the object of the
enterprise is to figure out answers to questions about the world and how it
works. Of course, it goes without saying that whenever one wants answers to
questions, one wants true answers. This is not to say that scientists seek THE
TRUTH, in some quasi-religious sense; nor is it to suggest that scientific truths
are the only truths, or that scientific truths are ever known with absolute
certainty. 9 But it is to say that when, for example, James Watson and Francis

Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73
effects of Daubert in civil trials).

BROOK. L. REV.

985, 990 (2008) (commenting on the

47. FED. R. EVID. 702 (2001).

48. George Lakoff, A Cognitive Scientist Looks at Daubert, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT
1) S114, S117 (2005) ("When a scientist is 'Dauberted out' of a trial, the repercussions for the scientist
are serious."); De-Daubertizing Economic Damages Evidence, LOSTCOMPENSATION.COM, Jan. 2006,

available at http://www.lostcompensation.com/newsletters/v3-il-2006.html
("A 'dauberted out'
economic expert in injury and wrongful death cases can be particularly disastrous.").
49. It is, however, to reject both the instrumentalist view that theoretical "statements" in science
are not really genuine statements at all, and so are neither true nor false, and the constructiveempiricist view that, although theoretical statements are statements, and do have truth-values, the goal
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Crick worked to "solve the structure of DNA," what they wanted was to reach
the answer that DNA is a double-helical, backbone-out macromolecule with
like-with-unlike base pairs if DNA is a double-helical, backbone-out
macromolecule with like-with-unlike base pairs, to reach the answer that DNA
is a triple-helical backbone-in macromolecule with like-with-like base pairs if it
is a triple-helical backbone-in, macromolecule with like-with-like base pairs,
and so on.
As the example suggests, once scientists have figured out the answer to one
question, new questions almost invariably arise-sometimes a whole cascade of
them: as, once they had worked out the structure of DNA, molecular biologists
next had to tackle the "Coding Problem," which it would take more than a
decade to solve." And as this in turn suggests, even though there is no
guarantee that every step will be in the right direction, it is in the nature of the
scientific enterprise to push forward, to tackle new questions with the help of
answers to older ones.
Of course, scientists seek not just true answers, but substantive, explanatory
answers ("either DNA is a double-helical, backbone-out macromolecule with
like-with-unlike base pairs, or not," though undeniably true, won't do).
Although scientific investigation sometimes focuses on particular things or
events-a particular planet, earthquake, eclipse, epidemic, or whatever-even
when it does, there is always a concern with laws, explanation, prediction; in
short, with the general. Medical scientists, for example, might investigate why
this individual seems unusually resistant to HIV infection; but the goal would be
to figure out what it is about him that makes him less susceptible.
Like historians, investigative journalists, detectives," or anyone seriously
trying to figure something out, scientists make informed guesses at the answers
to their questions, work out their consequences, seek out evidence to check how
well those consequences hold up, and use their judgment as to how to proceed
from there. There is no algorithmic "scientific method," no formal, or
formalizable, procedure available to all scientists and only to scientists, which,
faithfully followed, guarantees success, or even progress. But over centuries of
work, scientists have gradually developed a vast array of special tools and
techniques: ever more-powerful instruments of observation, ever more-cunning
(and sometimes very formally precise) experimental designs, ever moresophisticated mathematical and statistical techniques, ever fancier computer
programs, and so on. These scientific "helps" to inquiry usually develop in an ad
hoc way, in response to some problem at hand; and almost always they rely on

of science is empirical (in other words, observational) adequacy, not truth. I shall not argue either point
here, but refer readers to the arguments in HAACK, supra note 4, at 137-41.
50. HORACE FREELAND JUDSON,
REVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 488 (1979).

THE EIGHTH DAY OF CREATION: MAKERS OF THE

51. Nowadays, however, police detectives (and doubtless many private investigators too) will also
usually be concerned that they obtain evidence in such a way that it will be admissible in court.
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some earlier scientific innovation, theoretical or practical.52 The evolution of
such "technical" helps to inquiry has been an untidy, pragmatic, fallible,
bootstrap process that has gradually made it possible to get more and betterfocused evidence and to assess more accurately where evidence leads-in short,

to extend and amplify unaided human cognitive powers.
Because the core business of science is inquiry, the core values of science are
epistemological: honesty, with oneself and others, about what the evidence is
and what it shows, and willingness to make that evidence available to others in
the field-essentially the values Robert Merton articulated long ago under the
labels "disinterestedness" and "communism."53 Instilling and sustaining

commitment to these values isn't easy; scientists are fallible human beings, with
the usual, mixed and sometimes dubious motives, hopes, and fears. Still, besides
those technical helps, the sciences have developed informal social mechanisms
to enable the pooling of evidence and to provide incentives and disincentives,

which, up to a point, harness less-admirable motives, such as vanity or the
desire for prestige, to serious scientific work." However, while the technical
helps enabling scientists to acquire and assess evidence keep getting better and

better, these "social" helps do not; in fact, they are coming under increasing
strain both from the ever-growing scale of the scientific enterprise and from the
alien values of the governments and large industrial concerns on whose

financial support science increasingly depends-especially in the most
commercialized areas of science, the medical sciences in particular.
Where all but the very simplest scientific claims and theories are concerned,
the evidence will ramify in all directions; it is usually mediated by sophisticated

instruments; more often than not it is the shared resource of many people, who
may be working together or may be rivals, and who may be working in the same
laboratory or thousands of miles or many decades or even centuries apart; it is
almost invariably incomplete; and it is quite often ambiguous or misleading. At

any time, some scientific claims and theories are so well-established that it
would be astounding if they turned out to be wrong, some well- but not quite so

52. See, e.g., BETTYANN HOLTZMANN KEVLES, NAKED TO THE BONE: MEDICAL IMAGING IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1997) (presenting a history of medical-imaging techniques).
53. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 307 (1949). Merton's
understanding of science is nowadays regarded in some circles as hopelessly passe, but others believe,
on the contrary, that some insights of Merton's are now in danger of being lost. See also HAACK, supra
note 4, at 299-328 (discussing the values of science); SUSAN HAACK, The Integrity of Science: What It
Means, Why It Matters (1996), in PUTTING PHILOSOPHY TO WORK: INQUIRY AND ITS PLACE IN

CULTURE 106 (2008) (adopting and developing some of Merton's ideas about the norms of science).
54. Some professional scientific organizations now have formal codes of ethical conduct. See, e.g.,
America Society of Microbiology, http://www.asm.org/general.asp?bid=14777 (last visited Feb. 3, 2009);
Gerontological Society of America, http://www.geron.org/Membership/Code%20of%20Ethics/37Membership/131-code-of-ethics (last visited Feb. 3, 2009); International Union of Biochemistry and
Molecular Biology, www.babonline.org/bab/babcethics.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2009); American
Medical Association, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2009)
(stating the "9 principles of conduct" that define physicians' behavior and are the basis for the opinions
that make up the Code of Medical Ethics). Courses in ethics for science students are not uncommon;
but more formal arrangements like these cannot compensate for an erosion of the ethos of science.
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well-established, some rather speculative, some very speculative, some highly
speculative, and some downright wild and wacky. The proportion of the wellwarranted to the highly speculative varies, obviously, from field to field, with

some areas of science thus far more speculative than others, and some,
arguably, thus far mostly speculative; for some fields of science are more
advanced more "mature," as we say, others relatively new and thus-far
undeveloped, and some so undeveloped, so entirely speculative, that one might
understandably hesitate to call them "sciences" at all. The boundaries of the

enormously complex and uneven enterprise referred to by the commodious
word "science" are fuzzy, indeterminate, and frequently contested.
When the available evidence on some scientific question is seriously
incomplete, those who work in the relevant scientific community-some of
them probably more radical in temperament, others more conservative-may
reasonably disagree about the likelihood that this or that answer is correct. As
new evidence comes in, a consensus may eventually form that this once merely
speculative theory is probably right, or that that once seemingly promising
approach probably wrong. But there are no rules determining when a scientific
claim is well enough warranted by the evidence to be accepted, or badly enough
undermined by the evidence to be rejected; and neither, of course, do scientists

reach their "verdict" by taking a vote.55 Instead, consensus arises as a byproduct
when enough members of the relevant scientific subcommunity come to see the
evidence as strong enough to warrant this claim or that theory.
Ideally, such consensus would form when, and only when, the evidence is
sufficient; in practice, acceptance and warrant sometimes come apart. This may
be because significant evidence gets lost or neglected; 7 it may be because some
widely held but unwarranted assumption skews scientists' judgment;58 or it may
be the result of the influence or the persuasiveness of some individual or group

55. The recent vote by an international congress of astronomers to demote Pluto from the status of
planet was a vote to adopt the verbal convention that to count as a planet, a heavenly body should have
these and those characteristics; it was not a vote that Pluto lacks certain of these characteristics-which
is simply not the kind of thing that could be so decided. Dennis Overbye, Astronomers in Quandary
Over Pluto's Planet Status, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2006, at A20; Kenneth Chang, Dwarf Planet, Cause of
Strife, Gains "the Perfect Name," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A20.
56. Perhaps the first phrase of the Frye Rule, that the underlying scientific principle must be
"sufficiently established to be generally accepted in the field," was an implicit acknowledgment of this
possibility. If so, it is an insight that is lost when the Rule is abbreviated, as it usually is, to "general
acceptance." This prompts the speculation that the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Ramirez
II-where it seems on its face as if the court conducted a Daubert inquiry to determine the kind of
knife-mark identification on which Mr. Ramirez's conviction turned is generally accepted in the
field-might more plausibly be read as implicitly recognizing the significance of this initial phrase of the
test proposed in Frye. Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 845 (Fla. 2001).
57. Gregor Mendel's paper, effectively establishing the particulate theory of inheritance, lay
neglected and unread in the journal of the Natural History Society of Brno (Brinn), Moravia, for
decades. Frank Maloney, Gregor Johann Mendel O.S.A., Villanova University, available at
http://astro4.ast.vill.edu/mendel/gregor.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
58. See JUDSON, supra note 50, at 608-13 (discussing Phoebus Levine's tetranucleotide hypothesis,
which, though merely a conjecture, was so widely accepted as to hold back recognition that DNA is the
genetic material).
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in the field.59 But what counts in the end is not what person is most powerful or
most persuasive, but what approach proves most fruitful, which theory proves to

stand up best as evidence comes in. Watson really wanted to beat out Linus
Pauling and win a Nobel prize, but it would not have satisfied him to win simply
by being more persuasive than Pauling was; the point was to solve the structure
of DNA first. Had he aimed only to win the debate, only to persuade others to

his point of view, he would have been engaged in sham inquiry, that is, in
advocacy disguised as investigation, not the real thing.' Indeed, as Michael

Polanyi once put it, "Only if scientists remain loyal to scientific ideals rather
scientists can they form a
than try to achieve success with their ' 6fellow
1
community which will uphold those ideals."
Though some science is certainly policy-relevant, scientific investigation is,
in an important sense, policy-neutral.62 Scientists may, for example, explore the
risks and benefits of making this or that drug or pesticide available, or the longrun effects of damming that river or of relying on this rather than that energy
source; but whether the risks of the drug outweigh the benefits, whether the
river should be dammed, whether we should switch to an alternative energy
source, are not themselves scientific questions. However, when scientific work
bears closely on policy questions, the line between scientific inquiry and policy
advocacy can too easily get blurred.
Quite often, a scientist or scientific team will need to come up with some
kind of answer on a specific timetable, as when they are working under pressure
in an epidemic or in wartime, or simply because they need to report some
result at the end of the grant period to the outfit that funded them. But in such

circumstances the work is very apt to be skimped; for the unavoidable fact is
59. This is apparently what happened in Soviet biology in the decades in which it was impeded by
the influence of Trofim Lysenko's politically convenient, but badly mistaken, ideas. On the history of
Soviet biology in the Lysenko period, see, for example, WILLIAM BROAD & NICHOLAS WADE,
BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 186-92 (1982); GEORGE S. COUNTS & NUCIA LODGE, THE COUNTRY OF
THE BLIND: THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF MIND CONTROL (1949); NILS ROLL-HANSEN, THE LYSENKO
EFFECT: THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE (2005); VALERY N. SOYFER, THE TRAGEDY OF SOVIET SCIENCE

(Leo Gruliow & Rebecca Gruliow trans., 1994).
60. See SUSAN HAACK, "As for that phrase 'studying in a literary spirit'... ," in MANIFESTO OF A
PASSIONATE MODERATE: UNFASHIONABLE ESSAYS 48-68, 188-208 (1998) (developing from Charles
S. Peirce the idea of sham inquiry). The "Wedge Document," produced by the Center for Science and
Culture at the Discovery Institute and made public-apparently without the Center's authorization-in
1999, resembles nothing so much as a marketing plan for Intelligent Design Theory. This document
gives the lie to the pretense that IDT is a scientific conjecture giving rise to a bona fide research
program. Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture, The Wedge Strategy, available at
www.kcfs.org/Fliers-articles/Wedge.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008); see also BARBARA FORREST &
PAUL R. GROSS, CREATIONISM'S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2004)

(criticizing Intelligent Design Theory generally, and the Discovery Institute's Wedge Document
specifically).
61. MICHAEL POLANYI, SCIENCE, FAITH AND SOCIETY 40 (1946).

62. Some might argue that political science is an exception, but this is not an issue that can be
pursued here.
63. See JOHN BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA (2004) (a history of the hurried work to figure out
the cause of the 1918 flu epidemic); WILLIAM COOPER, THE STRUGGLES OF ALBERT WOODS (1952)
(a fictional account of hurried poison-gas research during World War II).
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that scientific inquiry takes the time it takes, and its progress is ragged and
unpredictable. It may be possible to say ahead of time how long it will take to
run this series of experiments, or how long that epidemiological study will
continue; but even the best-informed specialist can make only very tentative
and fallible estimates of how long it might be before this problem is solved, that
natural phenomenon understood. Moreover, at any time there are many
scientific questions to which there is no warranted answer, and to which
scientists can only say, "at the moment, we just don't know; we're working on it,
but we can't tell you when we will have it figured out."
I have stressed that the core business of science is inquiry; but not all those
who describe themselves as scientists are engaged in this core business (and
most of those who are will likely be engaged in fairly routine kinds of
investigation, not in the profound intellectual work of the heroes of the history
of science). Some scientists are mostly occupied with developing new
instruments, new techniques of purification, new computer programs, and so
forth and so on; another large class of people who might be described as
engaged in "scientific work" in an ample sense of that phrase are simply
applying well-established scientific techniques in relatively routine kinds of
testing; and some have borrowed the honorific description "science" for no
better reason than that they rely on scientific equipment of one kind or
another-or just because it makes their work seem more respectable.'
Nevertheless, the core business of science is inquiry. And scientific inquiry is
by nature tentative and thoroughly fallibilist; it focuses on the general law or
principle rather than on the particular case; its core values are intellectual
honesty and willingness to share evidence; its procedures are problem-oriented
and informally pragmatic; it is open-ended and forward-looking; and, though it
is quite often relevant to policy, it is policy-neutral. So it is hardly surprising
that the legal system has had trouble handling scientific testimony, for the legal
culture could hardly be more different: adversarial; focused on the specific case;
formally procedurally anchored; valuing promptness and finality; relying on
precedent; and not only relevant, but also sensitive, to policy.
Justice Blackmun writes in Daubert that there are "important differences
between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
' That's putting
laboratory."65
it mildly. The core business of a legal system is to
resolve disputes; and a trial aims not to find out whether the defendant is guilty
or liable, but to arrive at a determination of the defendant's guilt or liability"determine," here, probably being closer to "deem" than to "discover." This is
not to deny that inquiry plays a role in the legal process-of course it does; ' nor

64. Or, as in the case of "creation science," in hopes of circumventing legal problems.
65. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993).
66. Failure to investigate is one criterion of "ineffective assistance of counsel" in death-penalty
cases. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (reversing on the grounds that "the lawyers were
deficient in failing to examine the court file on Rompilla's prior conviction"); Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (reversing based on counsel's decision not to expand the investigation beyond the
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is it to deny that, although some cases are focused on legal technicalities, others
are centrally concerned with factual issues. But it is to deny that inquiry is quite
as central to the law as it is to science.
Moreover, as Justice Blackmun intimates, the way our legal system goes
about making its "determinations of the truth" is really quite unlike the
processes of scientific investigation: the law relies on an adversarial procedure,
subject to the relevant standard of proof, under the constraint of rules some of
which mandate the exclusion of relevant evidence for reasons that are not even
obliquely truth-related. And the advocacy that is at the core of the adversarial
process is a very different matter from inquiry. Inquiry starts with a question
and seeks out evidence, aiming to arrive at an answer; advocacy, aiming to
persuade, starts with a proposition to be defended and marshals the best
evidence it can in its favor. The obligation of a scientist, qua inquirer, is to seek
out as much evidence as he possibly can and to assess it as fairly as possible. By
contrast, the obligation of an attorney, qua advocate, is to make the best
possible case for his client's side of the dispute-including playing up the
evidence that favors his case, and explaining inconvenient evidence away if he
can't get it excluded.
Some, taking for granted that the legal system is in the relevant respects in
the same business as the sciences, object that it goes about that business in a
peculiar and ineffective way. C.S. Peirce said this quite explicitly: "Some
persons fancy that hot and partisan debate is the way to investigate. This is the
theory of our atrocious legal procedure. But Logic puts its heel upon this
suggestion."67 Judge Marvin Frankel is only a little more oblique: "We proclaim
to each other and to the world that the clash of adversaries is a powerful means
for hammering out the truth ....[But] [d]espite our untested statements of selfcongratulation, we know that others searching for the truth-in history,
geography, medicine, whatever-do not emulate our adversarial system. ' If
the legal system were in the same business as history, geography, or as physics
and the other sciences, its way of conducting that business would be peculiar,
and inefficient, to say the least. But the law is really not in exactly the same
business.
This is not at all to deny that it is desirable that legal determinations of guilt
or liability be, so far as possible, factually correct; on the contrary, it is highly

presentence investigation (PSI) and Department of Social Services (DSS) records, which "fell short of
the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989"); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 373

(2000) (reversing the death penalty and remanding on the grounds that counsel for the petitioner had
failed to seek Williams' juvenile and social-service records, "erroneously believ[ing] that 'state law
didn't permit it"'); American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1, 93 (1989) (instructing that counsel should make efforts to

discover "all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence
that may be introduced by the prosecutor").
67. CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE para. 635
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1932) (the passage quoted is dated 1878).
68. Marvin F. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036

(1975).
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desirable. But that "so far as possible" includes "consistent with satisfying such
non-truth-related desiderata as reaching a resolution within a reasonable period
of time, proceeding in accordance with constitutional constraints, and taking
' Given that the legal "quest
certain policy-related considerations into account."69
for truth" must be conducted within a relatively short time frame, it could be
argued that an adversarial system is a way of ensuring that the search for and
scrutiny of evidence is as thorough as possible within those constraints; though
only on certain assumptions, among them that the resources available to the
parties are roughly equal-assumptions that, sad to say, only too rarely obtain. °
Implicit in the previous paragraphs, but needing to be made explicit, are the
crucial differences between the legal and the scientific timetables. In the wake
of a major discovery, scientific investigation sometimes advances at an
impressive pace, rather as filling in a long, central crossword entry sometimes
enables you to solve a whole slew of others; often, though, scientific work is
halting and fumbling, slowed sometimes by lack of funds or by political
resistance to potentially unwelcome results, and often enough by the sheer
intellectual difficulty of the task. And there is always, at least in principle, the
possibility of having to go back and start over on what had been thought to be
settled questions. By contrast, not without reason, we want the legal system to
reach its determinations within a reasonable period of time; and, again not
without reason, we want those determinations, once the appeals process is
exhausted, to stand.
Also implicit in the preceding paragraphs, and also needing to be made
explicit, is that the legal process is highly regimented, conducted under formal
rules of procedure, and rules of evidence, and so on. Paul Feyerabend, selfstyled "court jester" of the philosophy of science, wrote of the "methodological
anarchism" of the sciences;71 and despite his tendency to wild exaggeration,
there is a grain of truth in this idea. It is not exactly that absolutely anything
goes; but scientific inquiry does have a kind of free-ranging, "just do it,"
improvising character. By contrast, the regimented procedures of the law look
more like a formal dance-a minuet, perhaps.
Also implicit, and also needing to be made explicit, is that some of the
questions answers to which are to be determined at trial, will be case-specific:
Did his mother's taking Bendectin cause Jeffrey Blum's birth defect? 2 Did his
69. As Robert Heilbrun's fictional public defender Arch Gold comments, "[tihis [the capitalsentencing hearing in which he was participating] wasn't the real world ....
It was a twisted kind of
theater, a 'reality-based' drama that had nothing to do with what really went on down there on
Twentieth Street." ROBERT HEILBRUN, OFFER OF PROOF 238 (2003).
70. The argument is developed, and its presuppositions explored, in Susan Haack, Epistemology
Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 43 (2004).
71. PAUL K. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINES OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE 10 (1975) (claiming that "[s]cience is an essentially anarchistic enterprise"); see also
HAACK, supra note 4, at 49-50 (criticizing Feyerabend's philosophy of science).
72. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 634 (Pa. C.P. 1988), rev'd, 560 A.2d 212
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd 626 A.2d 537 (Pa. 1993), remanded to 33 Phila. 193 (Pa. C.P. 1996), rev'd 705
A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), affm'd 764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000).
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occupational exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) promote Mr.
Joiner's cancer?73 What is the probability that the match between this DNA
sample from the crime scene and this defendant is a matter of chance?
Moreover, when they are not foreclosed by precedent, legal decisions will often
be influenced by policy considerations, for legal concepts are often tinged with
policy.
IV
THOSE "IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES" AT WORK

Against this background we can readily see why, as Mr. Humes so bluntly
puts it, "courts don't do science very well":" why the law has such difficulty in
handling scientific testimony, and so often gets less than the best out of
science. 5 But it is a very complicated, very tangled tale; for the tensions
between science and law interact and reinforce each other. I had hoped to be
able to shoehorn the difficulties into simple categories: "finality vs. fallibilism,"
"advocacy vs. inquiry," "inertia vs. innovation," and so on; but now this seems
impossibly neat and tidy. Here, instead, is a not-so-tidy list.
(i) Because its business is to resolve disputed issues, the law very often calls on
those fields of science where the pressure of commercial interests is most severe.
In tort litigation, for example, much of the scientific work bearing on issues of
causation may have been conducted by a drug company or a chemical
manufacturer, for marketing purposes or, quite often, with an eye to protecting
itself against litigation. This is exactly the kind of scientific work in which
commercial interests most severely strain the informal scientific mechanisms
that encourage honesty and discourage the withholding of evidence. I think in
this context of the wave of litigation by plaintiffs alleging that their
cardiovascular problems were aggravated by Merck's arthritis drug, Vioxx: for
we now know that Merck's first large clinical trial, the VIGOR study, on the
basis of which the FDA approved the drug, was designed in such a way as to be
more likely to identify favorable than unfavorable trends; 6 and that the
APPROVe study, which prompted the withdrawal of the drug, did not use the

73. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1997).
74. HUMES, supra note 2, at 257.
75. Its interactions with the law can also have deleterious effects on science. For example, scientists
whose work potentially bears on litigation are quite likely to find themselves interrupted and
overburdened by subpoenas and depositions. Legal Demands Take Time from Scientists' Real Work,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2007, at A5 (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). But these issues
cannot be pursued here.
76. The VIGOR study was designed to track gastrointestinal effects (anticipated to be favorable to
the drug) longer than cardiovascular effects (anticipated to be unfavorable). Claire Bombadier et al.,
Comparison of Upper GastrointestinalToxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid
Arthritis,343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000); David Armstrong, How the New EnglandJournalMissed
Warning Signs on Vioxx: Medical Weekly Waited Years to Report Flaws in Article, WALL ST. J., May 15,
2006, at Al, A10; see also Haack, supra note 44, at 804-07; HAACK, supra note 53, at 116-20 (telling the
Vioxx story).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 72:1

statistical method the published report of the study said it used, and would have
been even less favorable to Vioxx if it had."
(ii) Because the legal system aspires to resolve disputes promptly,78 the
scientific questions to which it seeks answers will often be those for which all the
evidence is not yet in. The cases that come to trial will normally be those in
which the evidence is thus far incomplete and ambiguous. For one thing,
plaintiffs must sue before the possibility of redress is legally foreclosed; for
another, when the evidence that a drug or chemical is dangerous is
overwhelming, plaintiffs' claims are likely to be settled out of court.
(iii) Because of its case-specificity, the legal system often demands answers of
a kind science is not well-equipped to supply; for related reasons, the legal system
constitutes virtually the entire market for certain fields of forensic science (or
quasi-science), and for certain psychiatric specialties. The first point is wellillustrated in Joiner: by the time of Mr. Joiner's suit, the toxicity of PCBs was
well-established; but how much, if at all, Mr. Joiner's occupational PCB
exposure contributed to his developing lung cancer--given that he had been a
smoker and that he had a family history of lung cancer-was an almost
impossibly difficult question." The clearest illustrations of the second point
come from such forensic-identification fields as hair or knife-mark analysis,"
and such psychiatric specialties as the recovery of supposedly repressed
1
memories or, again, prediction of future dangerousness _surely
among the
weakest of what we sometimes call the "soft," or social sciences.
(iv) Because of its adversarialcharacter,the legal system tends to draw in as
witnesses scientists who are in a sense marginal--more willing than most of their
colleagues to give an opinion on the basis of less-than-overwhelming evidence;
moreover, the more often he serves as an expert witness, the more unbudgeably
confident a scientist may become in his opinion. An attorney obligated to make

77. Scott D. Solomon et al., Cardiovascular Events Associated With Rofecoxib in a Colorectal
Adenoma Prevention Trial, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1092, 1093 (2005); Correction, 355 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 221 (2006); Heather Won Tesoriero, Vioxx Study Correction May Add Pressure to Merck's
Defense, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2006, at A2. In November 2007, Merck made a $4.85 billion settlement
deal with (a large class of) Vioxx plaintiffs. Heather Won Tesoriero, Sarah Rubenstein, & Janey Heller,
Vioxx Settlement for $4.85 Billion Largely Vindicates Merck's Tactics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2007, at Al,
A5.

78. 1 say "aspires" because, in practice, litigation is sometimes alarmingly protracted; for example,
the Blums first brought suit against Merrell Dow in 1982, but the case was not finally resolved until
2000. See supra text accompanying note 72.
79. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1997); see also Michael Gottesman, From
Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 766-76 (1998)
(discussing causation evidence, in Joinerand more generally).
80. See, e.g., Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms
and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCi. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2005) (arguing that "all firearms and
toolmark identifications should be excluded until adequate statistical empirical foundations and
proficiency testing are developed for the field").
81. See, e.g., Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of Future Dangerousness
Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 37 AKRON L. REV. 469
(2004) (discussing the scientific weaknesses of predictions of future dangerousness, and the role of such
predictions in Texas death-penalty hearings).
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the best possible case for his client will have an incentive to call on those
scientists who are ready to accept an answer to some scientific question as
warranted when others in the field still remain agnostic; and sometimes on
scientists whose involvement in litigation has hardened their initially morecautious attitudes into unwarranted certainty. I think, in this context, of Merrell
Dow's Robert Brent, always ready to testify that Bendectin does not cause birth

defects, 2 and psychiatrist Dr. James Grigson, testifying over and over in Texas
death-penalty hearings that the defendant would, to a psychiatric certainty, be
dangerous in future. 3

The adversarial process may distort even relatively strong science from
relatively strong fields, sometimes to such a degree that it creates a kind of
artificial scientific doubt,' or artificial scientific certainty; and can generate a
public perception that this product is well known to be dangerous, or that
product well known to be harmless, when really the evidence is weak,

ambiguous, or lacking. Public (mis?)perception that silicone breast implants
cause systemic connective-tissue disorders, for example, may have been
generated in part by the legal system. 5
Adversarialism can also cause distortions in the forensic sciences, not only

by encouraging the startling dogmatism with which knife-mark examiners, for
example, routinely assert that they can make a match with one hundred percent

82. In Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 33 Phila. 193 (Pa. C.P. 1996), Merrell Dow's
experts included Dr. Brent, who had not only testified over and over that Bendectin was not
teratogenic, but had even published an article in which he analyzed seventeen Bendectin cases and
concluded that every one of the plaintiffs had lied; and the Blums' experts included Dr. Alan Done,
who had served as plaintiffs' expert in a number of Bendectin cases and, understandably troubled by
some flaws in the clinical trials and animal studies on which the defendants relied, was willing to
conclude that his mother's taking Bendectin while pregnant could have caused Jeffrey Blum to be born
with clubbed feet. See also Susan Haack, What's Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in
Legal Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1063-69 (2008) (analyzing the expert evidence in
Blum).
83. See Regnier, supra note 81, at 480-82 (describing the role of Dr. Grigson in Texas deathpenalty hearings).
84. See, e.g., David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty: Contested Science
and the Protection of the Public's Health and Environment, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1)
S39 (2005) (arguing that "opponents of public health and environmental regulation often try to
'manufacture uncertainty' by questioning the validity of scientific evidence on which the regulations are
based").
85. One study found a statistically significant correlation between silicone breast implants and
connective-tissue disorders; however, this study was seriously flawed, depending on subjects' own
reports of their medical problems. Charles H. Hennekens et al., Self-reported Breast Implants and
Connective-Tissue Diseases in Female Health Professionals, 275 J. AM. MED. ASsOC. 616 (1996). In
1998, Judge Samuel Pointer's National Science Panel and, the following year an independent National
Institute of Medicine Panel both reached the conclusion that there was no evidence that the implants
cause
such
disorders.
Report
from
National
Science
Panel,
available at
http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/SCIENCE/report.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2008); Safety of Silicone
Breast Implants (Stuart Bondurant, Virginia Ernster, & Roger Herdman, eds.) 211-32 (2000)
(concluding that "[t]he committee finds no convincing evidence for atypical connective tissue ...
disease in women with silicone breast implants").
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certainty, and that they never make mistaken identifications,' but also by
fostering the kinds of mistakes that can occur in the application even of
scientifically very solid forensic-identification

techniques,

such as DNA

analysis, when technicians are too anxious to be "helpful," to get the results
law-enforcement needs."
(v) Legal rules can make it impossible to bring potentially useful scientific
information to light; and the legal penchant for rules, "indicia," and the like
sometimes transmutes scientific subtleties into formulaic legal shibboleths.

Courts' obligation to screen out unreliable scientific evidence has amplified the
epistemological atomism of the rules of evidence, for judges rule not only on
which proffered expert witnesses may testify, but also on whether they may
testify to this or that question specifically.88 This can be a problem: for
interlocking pieces of evidence (for example, toxicological information, animal
studies, and epidemiological data), none of which is sufficient by itself, may
jointly constitute adequate warrant for a claim that this exposure likely caused a
plaintiff's injury;89 but if no individual piece of it is deemed reliable enough to be

admissible, a jury might never hear such evidence. The issue of "weight of
evidence methodology" was explicit both in the Court of Appeals' reversal of
the district court's exclusion of Mr. Joiner's expert testimony and in Justice
Stevens's dissent in Joiner;' but it was already implicit in Daubert,having come
86. See Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 840-41 (Fla. 2001) (reporting that expert witness Robert
Hart's "specific knife mark identification evidence played a crucial role in the trial: [t]he trial court
allowed the expert to state, 'The result of my examination made from the microscopic similarity, which
I observed from both the cut cartilage and the standard mark, was the stab wound in the victim was
made by this particular knife to the exclusion of all others."').
87. The story was extensively reported in the Houston Chronicle. See, e.g., Alan Bernstein, Crime
Lab Scandal Leaves Prosecutor Feeling Betrayed: Owmby Says Sutton Case Tests Faith in Justice
System, HOUS. CHRON., May 16, 2003, at A23; Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, HPD Ignored
Warnings, Ex-Lab Man Says: Retired Official Says He Cited "Train Wreck," HOUS. CHRON., June 23,
2003, at Al; Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Police Chief Shakes Up Crime Lab; 2 Officials Quit,
Others Disciplined, HOUS. CHRON., June 13, 2003, at Al; Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, 3 Say
Chief Knew of Lab Woes; BradfordSays Some Disgruntled Employees Trying to DiscreditHim, Hous.
CHRON., June 22, 2003, at Al; Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, 93 HPD Cases Under Scrutiny:
Investigator's New Report Raises Figure From 27, HOUS. CHRON., May 11, 2006, at B1.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Llera-Plaza, Nos. CR. 98-362-10, CR. 98-362-11, 98-362-12, 2002 WL
27305 at *19 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (allowing FBI
fingerprint examiners to testify about how they raised latent prints, about the characteristics of these
latents from the crime scene, et cetera, but not to testify as to whether there was a match with the
defendant).
89. See Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert, 4 J.
HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 253 (2008).
90. In Joiner v. General Electric Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1324-26 (1994), the District Court, noting
that none of the animal studies or the epidemiological studies on which Joiner's experts relied was
sufficient by itself to establish that PCB exposure promoted his small-cell lung cancer, ruled that
Joiner's expert testimony was inadmissible. In Joiner v. GeneralElectric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 532 (11th Cir.
1996), the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that "[o]pinions of any kind are derived
from individual pieces of evidence, each of which by itself might not be conclusive, but when viewed in
their entirety are the building blocks of a perfectly reasonable conclusion .... At the Supreme Court,
Justice Stevens' endorsed this idea. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 152 (1997). I am being
deliberately noncommittal about whether the evidence Mr. Joiner's attorneys presented really did
interlock in such a way as sufficiently to warrant his claim, in part because only part of that evidence is
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to the surface when, on remand, reasoning that each and every one of the
Dauberts' experts would have to be excluded under Daubert as they had been
under Frye, Judge Kozinski affirmed the district court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of Merrell Dow."
Moreover, the legal system has a way of relying on brief verbal formulae to
encapsulate key concepts or principles, to provide guidelines, and to give
"indicia" of this or that. As a result, the law sometimes "rigidifies" ideas that

scientists themselves treat much more flexibly. For example, though peerreviewed publication is now standard practice at scientific and medical journals,
I doubt that many working scientists imagine that the fact that a work has been
accepted for publication after peer review is any guarantee that it is good stuff,
or that its not having been published necessarily undermines its value.92 The
legal system, however, has come to invest considerable epistemic confidence in
peer-reviewed publication 93-perhaps for no better reason than that the law
reviews are not peer-reviewed! Again, though requiring statistical significance is
now also routine scientific practice, most scientists are probably aware of the
element of arbitrariness in the usual standards; 4 but legal actors sometimes
seem to invest statistical significance with-well, with undue significance. And

the law sometimes tinges scientific concepts with policy considerations-which
partly explains why, for example, legal and scientific conceptions of causation

don't quite mesh: the legal conception is informed by considerations about
incentives and disincentives, about who should bear the costs of potentially

risky enterprises, and sometimes about whose fault it is that evidence is
lacking-considerations quite alien to science.
And the brief verbal formulae on which the law often relies can be
ambiguous. For example, Justice Blackmun's observations about "peer review
and publication"' could be taken as requiring that scientific testimony be based

on work that has survived the pre-publication peer-review process of scientific
journals-which is relatively easy for a court to determine, but a poor indication

described in the Court's ruling in Joiner. In any case, the point here is only that evidence may interlock
in this way, and that evidence law may prevent this from becoming apparent.
91. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1310-12 (9th Cir. 1995).
92. For example, the scientists on Judge Pointer's National Science Panel (set up to sift through the
evidence about silicone breast implants and connective-tissue disorders) included unpublished
dissertations and letters, as well as published material, as providing evidence relevant to their task.
Submission of Rule 706 National Science Panel Report, In Re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Product
Liability Litigation, No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 8 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 1998), available at www.fjc.gov/BREIM
LIT/SCIENCE/report.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
93. The legal preoccupation extends beyond issues of scientific testimony; for example, in
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (M.D. Pa. 2005), that there were no
publications on Intelligent Design Theory in peer-reviewed scientific journals was taken as an
indication that IDT is not science, but religion.
94. Reviewers for the Journal of the American Medical Association imposed a higher than usual
standard of statistical significance in assessing the recent re-analysis of the Women's Health Initiative
data on hormone-replacement therapy. Tara Parker Pope, New Study Reassures Most Users of
Hormones, WALL ST.J., Apr. 4,2007, at Al, A12.
95. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
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of reliability. Or they could be taken as requiring that such testimony be based
on work that has survived and will continue to survive the long-run scrutiny of
scientists in the field-which is a better (though still imperfect) indication of
reliability, but impossible for a court to determine.' There is a similar ambiguity
in Judge Kozinski's fifth "Daubertfactor": whether the work on which scientific
testimony is based is "litigation-driven." ' It is reasonably easy for a court to
determine whether the work on which testimony is based was undertaken after
litigation began, but this is a very weak indicator of unreliability; whether the
design or interpretation of the work on which the testimony is based was
significantly affected by litigation-related considerations is a better indication of
unreliability, but this is much harder for a court to determine.'
(vi) Both because of its concern for precedent, and because of the
desideratum of finality, the legal system has a tendency to inertia, and sometimes
lags behind science. The novel scientific testimony excluded by the Frye court
was proffered by the defense: Mr. Frye had passed a then-new blood-pressure
deception test, "monograph" evidence, you might say; but by the time Florida
first endorsed the Frye test in Kaminski, what was at stake was the admissibility
of polygraph evidence.' The introduction of DNA "fingerprinting" in the late
1980s met with significant resistance in the ensuing "DNA Wars"; and even
after the reliability of DNA analysis and its power to enable justice was
acknowledged, prosecutors pushed back against requests for post-conviction
testing."' One might conjecture that Daubert and, especially, Joinerwould have
lessened the tendency for courts to follow other courts' rulings about the
reliability of this or that kind of scientific evidence; but some commentators
argue that Joiner has led judges who feel uneasy about the possibility that the
very same evidence might be ruled reliable by one court and unreliable by

96. See HAACK, supra note 44, at 791, 808-15 (distinguishing the two senses of "peer review" and
tracing the consequences of this ambiguity).
97. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
98. See Haack, supranote 82, at 1078-81 (distinguishing the two senses of "litigation-driven").
99. Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952) (ruling lie-detector evidence inadmissible, and
citing Frye, but without specifying the nature of the lie-detector technology at issue); Don Grubin &
Lars Mardin, Lie Detection and the Polygraph:A Historical Review, 16 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY &
PSYCHOL. 357, 359-60 (reporting that the systolic-blood-pressure deception test at issue in Frye was
devised by William Marston in 1915; that John Larson developed the first modern polygraph machine
(measuring blood pressure, pulse rate, and respiration rate) in 1921; and that in 1939 Leonarde Keeler
added the galvanic-skin-response channel to the polygraph).

100. See e.g., DAVID LAZER, DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF
JUSTICE 5 (2004) (writing of the "lack of receptivity of the system to post-conviction application of
DNA analysis"); MARGARET BERGER, Lessons from DNA: Restriking the Balance between Finality
and Justice, in LAZER, supra,at 109, 120 ( "Prosecutors have been reluctant to report possible failing in
the laboratory .... ). But see Anna S. Leggett & Joseph L. Peterson, The Evolution of Forensic Science:
Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 630 (2007) ("Soon after DNA evidence's initial
introduction to courts in the mid-1980s, defense attorneys mounted a more vigorous challenge to
prosecution test results .... ").
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another in the same jurisdiction
precedential. "°

to treat such evidentiary rulings as

V
CAN THIS MARRIAGE BE SAVED?

Obviously, divorce is out of the question; the law can't do without scientific
testimony.
Both partners have tried to adapt. For example, there have been small but
significant legal changes, including extensions of the statute of limitations to
enable the prosecution of long-ago crimes when the perpetrator can now be
identified by DNA analysis, or to enable testing of samples that might

exonerate those already convicted-small compromises of the law's concern for
promptness and finality; and there has been a modest increase in courts' use of

their power to appoint

their own experts-a

small compromise

of

adversarialism. And on the scientific side, besides efforts to provide legally

relevant scientific education for judges, there is, for example, the CASE (Court
Appointed Scientific Expert) Project initiated by the AAAS (American
Association for the Advancement of Science) in 1999 to provide "independent
scientists who would educate the court, testify at trial, assess the litigants' cases,

and otherwise aid in the process of determining the truth,"'' ° and the Registry of
Independent Scientific and Technical Advisors set up by Duke University
School of Law.' 3

Not surprisingly, however, such adaptations don't always work out quite as
planned. The AAAS has learned that, quite often, when a judge announces that
he will seek their advice in identifying independent experts, the upshot is not
that CASE experts are appointed, but that the case is promptly settled.' And
judges have learned that there is no guarantee that court-appointed experts will
agree among themselves; in Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals,Inc., for example,
two of three court-appointed experts concluded that the methodology the
plaintiff's expert witnesses had used in arriving at the opinion that Ms. Soldo's
stroke had been caused by the anti-lactation drug Parlodel was not reliable, but

101. See Heinzerling, supra note 46, at 81 (arguing that "[o]ne consequence of this lax [abuse of
discretion] standard of review is that district judges may come to different conclusions on the same
evidence ....One can imagine, therefore, the (perhaps unconscious) desire of judges to tidy up this
mess by applying stare decisis principles to evidentiary rulings").
102. Doug Bandow, KeepingJunk Science Out of the Courtroom, WALL ST. J., July 26,1999, at A23.
103. Sometimes, also, scientific bodies have disciplined members for their testimony in court: for
example, in 1995 the American Psychiatric Association expelled Dr. Grigson for his irresponsible
testimony in Texas death-penalty cases. Laura Bell, Groups Expel Psychiatrist Known for Murder
Cases, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 26, 1995, at A21; "Dr. Death" Loses 2 Memberships Over Ethics
Accusations, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 27, 1995, at A25. Subsequently, Dr. Grigson
continued to testify, mostly for the defense, but in at least two instances for the prosecution. Wesbrook
v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
104. As I learned from Dr. Mark Frankel (Director of the CASE Project) at a workshop at Albany
Law School in December 2006.
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the third concluded that it was. 5 (The court granted summary judgment to the
defendant.)"
Just as I began writing this paper when I had little more than the title, a
local radio station began playing Beatles music all day long; and I toyed with
the idea of entitling the last section, "We Can Work It Out." A nice idea; but it
would have promised more than I can deliver. Still, let me try, at least, to
suggest what might be fruitful ways to think about the problems diagnosed here.
In Defending Science I wrote that, rather than expend all our ingenuity and
energy on trying to refine legal rules on expert testimony, we might do better to
consider other ways of mitigating the tensions;' 7 now I will add that it seems
desirable-given that no complete or perfect solution is likely to be
forthcoming-to think about what the most significant concerns are, and what
could be done about these.
One major concern is that, whatever the effect of Daubert in civil cases, it
has had startlingly little effect on issues about forensic testimony in criminal
cases'--though we have ample reason to believe that such testimony is at best
variable in quality. In a Frye state like Florida, criminal-defense attorneys
sometimes speculate wistfully about how much better things would be in a
Daubertjurisdiction; but it is not easy to share their optimism. "The only way to
guard against the misapplication of forensic science is to impose controls and
reforms long before the cases come to court," writes Peter Neufeld.' ° Whether
or not this is the only way, it is hard to deny that it might well be a better way. In
the case of DNA identification, where there is solid underlying science, the
most important thing is to ensure that the techniques are not misapplied
through haste, sloppiness, mismanagement, or dishonesty, conscious or
unconscious. In the case of latent-fingerprint- or knife-mark identifications and
the like, however, where the underlying science is weak or nonexistent, the first
thing is to find out just how reliable such identifications are.
Another major concern is highlighted by Justice Breyer's observation about
trying to ensure that the "powerful engine" of tort litigation is directed, not at
harmless and useful products, but at harmful stuff°--this in his concurring
opinion in Joiner, of all places, where the stuff in question was PCBs, so toxic
they had already been banned for decades! What we want is, so far as possible,
105. Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 503-04 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Soldo v. Sandoz
Pharms. Corp., No. 98-1712, 2003 WL 22005893, T 732 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2003) (order filing reports of
court-appointed experts David Flockhart, William J. Powers, and David Savitz as part of the record).
106. Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
107. HAACK, supra note 4, at 256.
108. For example, by the time of United States v. Llera-Plaza,Nos. CR 98-362-10, CR 98-362-11, CR
98-362-12, 2002 WL 27305, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
there had been more than forty Daubert challenges to latent-fingerprint identification testimony, but
none had succeeded. Six weeks later, in United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa.
2002), Judge Pollack reversed his restriction of such testimony.
109. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to CriminalJustice and Some Suggestions
for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S107, S107 (2005).

110. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1997).
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to prevent dangerous stuff from coming on the market, and to do this without
discouraging the production of useful and harmless stuff; and to ensure that, if
dangerous stuff does creep in and people are damaged, the victims are taken
care of, and the danger of future injury promptly averted. I suspect that we rely
too much on the tort system-which seems in practice, to be something of a
lottery, and which, in any case, surely ought to be the very last resort-when we
ought to be asking about other ways of achieving those highly desirable ends.
Maybe we could learn something from the experiences of other countries that
are equally technologically advanced, but have different regulatory and legal
arrangements; certainly, we would do well to approach these problems in a
more empirical, experimental-a more scientific-spirit.

